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Abstract 
 
We find a general, language-independent pattern in child language acquisition in which there 
is a clear difference between subject and object noun phrases. On the one hand, indefinite 
objects tend to be interpreted non-referentially, independently of word order and across 
experiments and languages. On the other hand, indefinite subjects tend to be interpreted 
referentially in most contexts, even in contexts where adults would favour a non-referential 
reading. In this article we offer an explanation for this pattern within the framework of 
bidirectional Optimality Theory. This explanation will focus on clarifying in what sense 
children's interpretations deviate from the adult interpretations, and clarifying the nature of 
the linguistic knowledge that the 4-year old child will need to acquire in order to become a 
competent, adult-like speaker and hearer of her language. 
 
 
1. A subject-object asymmetry in interpretation 
 
Consider the following sentence (Lidz and Musolino 2002): 
        
(1) Donald didn't find two guys. 
 
In principle, the sentence in (1) can have two readings depending on whether the object is 
interpreted within the scope of the negation or outside the scope of the negation. Hence, the 
readings may be paraphrased as ‘It is not the case that Donald found two guys’ and ‘There are 
two guys that Donald didn’t find’, respectively. It can also be argued that the difference in 
interpretation lies in the interpretation of the object two guys. In the ‘wide scope’ reading, the 
object denotes referentially, whereas in the ‘narrow scope’ reading the object denotes non-
referentially. 
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We are aware of the fact that different authors have labeled the two readings differently, 
depending on their different analyses of how the two interpretations come about, but in this 
paper we will stick to the labels referential and non-referential to refer to the relevant 
readings of indefinite objects. The difference between the referential and non-referential 
readings is evident also in sentence pairs that lack scope interactions, as is illustrated below. 
The two readings differ in the anaphoric element they may combine with. On the one hand, 
when the object a guy is interpreted non-referentially, it may be followed by the indefinite 
anaphor one in (2). On the other hand, when the indefinite object is interpreted referentially, it 
may be followed by the referential pronoun him in (3).  
 
(2) Donald saw a guy, and Ronald saw one too.   [non-referential] 
(3) Donald saw a guy, and Ronald saw him too.   [referential] 
 
In the remainder of this article we are mainly concerned with indefinite noun phrases. In 
accordance with many proposals in the literature, we assume that the referential reading 
corresponds to type e in extensional type theory, while the non-referential reading of an 
indefinite is assumed to correspond to type <e,t>, i.e. the predicative type (Partee 1987; Van 
Geenhoven 1996; van der Does and de Hoop 1998) 
 Lidz and Musolino (2002) tested children’s as well as adults’ interpretations of 
sentences like (1) above. While they found that adult speakers of English can easily get both 
readings, the (4-year-old) children have a strong preference for the non-referential object 
reading. They found similar results for Kannada, a Dravidian language. 
 
(4) naanu  eraDu  pustaka  ood-al-illa. 
INOM two book   read-INF-NEG 
“I didn't read two books.” 
 
As  pointed out by Lidz and Musolino (2002), a sentence like (4) is ambiguous between a 
referential and a non-referential object reading in Kannada too, as witnessed by the fact that 
adult speakers of Kannada easily get both readings. Moreover, Lidz and Musolino (2002) 
found the same pattern for children as observed for English, namely that the children have a 
strong preference for the non-referential reading of the object noun phrase. 
 The above observations are in accordance with the pattern found for Dutch (Krämer 
2000).  
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(5) Je   mag twee  keer een  potje  omdraaien. 
you  may  two  time a pot around-turn 
“You may turn a pot around twice.” 
 
(6) Je   mag een potje  twee  keer omdraaien. 
you  may  a      pot  two  time around-turn 
“You may turn a pot around twice.” 
 
In Dutch, the indefinite object noun phrase can either occur to the right of the adverbial phrase 
twee keer ‘twice’ as in (5), or it can occur to the left of it, as in (6). The left position in (6) is 
usually referred to as the scrambled position, the right position in (5) as the unscrambled 
position. Krämer (2000) tested the interpretation of scrambled and unscrambled indefinite 
objects in children between 4;0 and 8;0. Children as well as adults get a non-referential 
reading for the unscrambled indefinite. For most children below age 7, however, the 
scrambled indefinites are also interpreted non-referentially, whereas adults always interpret 
the scrambled indefinites referentially.  
To sum up, for all of the above sentences, it was found that children between roughly 
4 and 6 years old prefer to interpret the object noun phrases non-referentially, even in 
situations when adults interpret them referentially. As the examples show, the children's 
preference for non-referential direct objects is not determined by word order, as the object 
follows the adverbial element in English, whereas it precedes it in Kannada and Dutch, nor 
can it be determined by a structural relation such as c-command (contra Lidz and Musolino 
2002) as the referential object is assumed to be c-commanded by the adverbial phrase in 
English and Kannada, but crucially it is not in Dutch.  
One straightforward explanation for these findings could be that children have a 
general preference to interpret indefinite noun phrases non-referentially. As a consequence, 
the indefiniteness of the noun phrase would lead to a non-referential reading, independent of 
its position in the sentence. However, this cannot be the right explanation, as for indefinite 
subjects, the picture is completely different. In a number of experiments, children, just like 
adults, provided nearly exclusively referential interpretations of indefinite subject noun 
phrases. Consider for example (7) (Musolino 1998). 
 
(7) Some horses won't jump over the fence. 
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Musolino (1998) found that sentence (7) was accepted by the children 100% of the time as a 
remark about a story in which some horses did, and some horses did not jump over the fence. 
In other words, all children interpreted the subject in (7) referentially. Musolino’s findings 
were consistent with the findings of Bergsma-Klein (1996) for Dutch. She found that children 
correctly assign a referential (‘wide scope’) reading to indefinite subjects as in (8). 
 
(8) Een meisje  gleed  twee  keer  uit. 
A   girl slipped two time outPARTICLE 
“A girl slipped twice.”  
 
At this point, we conclude that cross-linguistically we find a subject-object asymmetry in 
children’s interpretation of indefinites. When adults assign a referential interpretation to 
indefinite subjects, children generally do the same (Bergsma-Klein 1996; Musolino 1998; 
Krämer 2000). But when adults assign a referential interpretation to indefinite objects, 
children cross-linguistically do not do the same (Bergsma-Klein 1996; Krämer 1998; 
Musolino 1998; Foley, Lust et al. 2000; Krämer 2000; Su 2001; Lidz and Musolino 2002; 
Miller 2002).  
So far, we have concentrated on the subject-object asymmetry as far as it concerns the 
referential interpretation of indefinite noun phrases. The asymmetry can be further extended, 
however, when we consider the non-referential interpretation of indefinites. As we mentioned 
above, when adults assign a non-referential (‘narrow scope’) reading to an object, so do 
children (de Boysson-Bardiès and Bacri 1977; Krämer 1998; Krämer 2000; Lidz and 
Musolino 2002). For example, 100% of the children between 4;0 and 6;10 years old correctly 
interpret the indefinite object in (9) non-referentially (Krämer 2000). 
 
(9) Het  meisje  heeft  geen  appel  geplukt. 
the  girl has no apple picked 
“The girl didn’t pick an apple.” 
 
A final piece of evidence for the subject-object asymmetry concerns the non-referential 
reading of indefinite subjects. Termeer (2002) recently found that when adults assign a non-
referential interpretation to a subject, children prefer a referential interpretation. That is, only 
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32% of the children between age 8;7 and 10;4 get an adult-like non-referential (‘narrow 
scope’) reading for the embedded indefinite subject in (10) (Termeer 2002). 
 
(10) Er   ging  twee  keer  een  jongen  van  de  glijbaan  af. 
there went two  time a boy of the slide  off 
“Twice, there went a boy down the slide.” 
 
In conclusion, children are adult-like in their interpretation of referential indefinite subjects 
and in their interpretation of non-referential indefinite objects. They differ from adults when 
they have to interpret non-referential indefinite subjects and when they have to interpret 
referential indefinite objects. How can we explain this pattern? Note that cross-linguistically 
subjects outrank objects in referentiality. It is a well-known typological generalization, 
supported by statistical evidence, that subjects tend to be referential, definite, topical, animate, 
high-prominent in the discourse, among other notions, while objects tend to be non-referential, 
indefinite, inanimate, low-prominent in the discourse, instead (a.o. Comrie 1989; Aissen 2003; 
Lee 2003). Children seem to behave in accordance with that generalization, that is, they 
assign a referential interpretation to subjects and a non-referential interpretation to objects. 
Adults, however, can depart from this pattern when required. More precisely, they are able to 
assign a non-referential reading to indefinite subjects, and a referential reading to indefinite 
objects. Children’s non-adultlike interpretations of the example sentences above can be 
characterized as a failure to depart from the general pattern. Why do children fail in this 
respect? In section 2 we will analyze the adult pattern in terms of markedness and we will 
provide an Optimality Theoretic account of this pattern in section 3. Our account can also 
straightforwardly explain why children deviate from the adult pattern in exactly the way they 
do. 
  
 
2. Form and meaning of indefinites and the principle of markedness 
 
In this section we will discuss the markedness principle (a.o. Horn 1984) with respect to 
subject and object position and meaning. The markedness principle states that marked forms 
are used for marked meanings. As a consequence, if both marked and unmarked forms are 
available, unmarked forms tend to be used for unmarked meanings.  
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 Let us start with the position and meaning of objects in Dutch. We have seen above 
that indefinite objects can occur either to the right of an adverb (the unscrambled position) or 
to its left (the scrambled position). This is illustrated in the sentences (11) and (12) below: 
 
(11) ... dat  ik  net  een  zwarte  kat  zag. 
... that  I just a black cat saw 
“... that I just saw a black cat.” 
 
(12) ... dat  ik  een  zwarte  kat  net  zag. 
... that I a black cat just saw 
“...that I just saw a black cat.”  
 
The preferred reading of the unscrambled indefinite object in (11) is the non-referential 
reading which is indeed the unmarked (i.e., most frequent) meaning for indefinite objects. In 
contrast, the scrambled indefinite object in (12) receives a referential (‘specific’) reading. The 
unmarked (most frequent) position for indefinite objects is the unscrambled position. When an 
indefinite object ends up in the marked (scrambled) position, this gives rise to a shift in 
meaning. In (12), the indefinite object gets a referential reading, which may indeed be 
considered a marked (less frequent) meaning of an indefinite object. Note that other ‘marked’ 
meanings happen to exist as well, such as ‘generic’, or ‘contrastively focussed’ readings, 
dependent on the nature of the noun phrase, the adverb and the context (cf. a.o. de Hoop 
1996). In other words, the relation between form and meaning of scrambled and unscrambled 
indefinite objects is in accordance with the markedness principle. 
 The scrambled position is not the marked (less frequent) position for all objects. 
Pronouns usually scramble, so for pronouns the word order in (14) is the unmarked one. 
 
(13) ... dat  ik  op  een  feestje  hem  zag. 
... that I at a party him saw 
“...that I saw him at a party.”  
 
(14) ... dat  ik  hem  op  een  feestje  zag. 
... that I him at a party saw 
“...that I saw him at a party.”  
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The unmarked reading that goes with the unmarked (scrambled) position of the pronominal 
object in (14) is the anaphoric reading. When the pronoun occupies the marked (unscrambled) 
position, this induces a shift in meaning. The reading that arises for the pronoun in the 
unscrambled position in (13) is a deictic (i.e. non-anaphoric) reading, which is indeed a 
marked (less frequent) meaning for pronouns. It is naturally obtained when the speaker 
stresses the pronoun, preferably accompanied by a movement of the head towards a male 
individual or by pointing her finger at him. 
 To sum up, we see that scrambling in Dutch obeys the principle of markedness, i.e., 
marked forms are used for marked meanings. For pronominal objects, this means that the 
unscrambled position is used for the deictic interpretation, while for indefinite objects, this 
means that the scrambled position is used for the referential interpretation. 
 Let us now turn to indefinite subjects. Indefinite subjects can occur either in standard 
(sentence-initial) subject position, or in the embedded position in a there-sentence. The two 
positions can be associated with two different readings (Milsark 1977).  
 
(15) Een  konijn  kwam  uit  de  hoed. 
a  rabbit came out the hat 
“A rabbit came out of the hat.” 
 
(16) Er   kwam  een  konijn  uit  de  hoed. 
there came a rabbit out the hat 
“There came a rabbit out of the hat.” 
 
There is a difference between Dutch and English (cf. De Hoop 1996), but at least what the 
two languages have in common is that the preferred reading for the indefinite subject in (15) 
is the referential reading (the rabbit plays an active role in the discourse), whereas the 
preferred reading for the indefinite subject in (16) is the non-referential (purely existential) 
reading. 
As to form, example (15) presents what we consider the unmarked case: the subject 
appears in standard subject position. As a consequence of the assumption that the standard 
subject position is the unmarked position for subjects, we take the embedded position in the 
existential sentence to be a marked (less frequent) position for subjects. As to the meaning of 
indefinite subjects, we observe a conflict in interpretation. On the one hand, subjects tend to 
get a referential interpretation (they outrank objects in terms of prominence or referentiality), 
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in accordance with the subject-object asymmetry of interpretation. On the other hand, 
indefinites tend to get a non-referential interpretation (as the term ‘indefinite’ already suggests, 
indefinites favour an indefinite, i.e. non-specific, non-referential reading). Thus, unlike in the 
case of indefinite objects, the two conditions are in conflict. We assume that the first 
condition is the strongest one, such that the referential reading is the unmarked reading for 
indefinite subjects. In accordance with the markedness principle, the unmarked, referential, 
reading is then associated with the unmarked form (the standard subject position). The 
marked meaning for indefinite subjects is the non-referential reading which arises when the 
subject is encountered in the marked (embedded) subject position.  
 In conclusion, the subject-object asymmetry in connection with the markedness 
principle adequately describes the adult pattern of the interpretation of indefinite noun phrases 
in relation to their position in the sentence. On the one hand, the unmarked reading for an 
indefinite object noun phrase is the non-referential reading (triggered both by the 
indefiniteness of the noun phrase and the fact that it is the object). On the other hand, the 
unmarked reading for an indefinite subject is the referential reading (in accordance with the 
subject-object asymmetry, but thereby violating the indefiniteness condition). Furthermore, 
the unmarked position for an indefinite object is the unscrambled position, and the unmarked 
position for an indefinite subject is the standard subject position. Hence, the markedness 
principle correctly derives the fact that adults link the scrambled position to the referential 
reading of indefinite objects and the embedded subject position to the non-referential reading 
of indefinite subjects. In the next section, we will offer an Optimality Theoretic analysis of 
this adult pattern that can then be used to explain why and in what sense exactly children 
deviate from this pattern.  
 
 
3. An Optimality Theoretic analysis of the subject-object asymmetry 
 
In this section we will develop an Optimality Theoretic account of the optimal interpretations 
of indefinite subjects and objects. We will not only explain why the optimal interpretation of 
an indefinite object is usually the non-referential reading (the unmarked case), but also 
elaborate upon the derivation of the marked, referential, reading for an indefinite object in a 
certain context. We will do the same for the unmarked, referential, and the marked, non-
referential readings of indefinite subject.  
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Subsequently, we will show how we may link markedness of form to markedness of 
meaning using a bidirectional Optimality Theoretic approach, following Blutner (2000). The 
markedness principle is widely attested across the languages of the world (cf. a.o. Horn 1984). 
Recall that the markedness principle states that marked forms are used for marked meanings 
(and unmarked forms for unmarked meanings). Blutner (2000) has proven the markedness 
principle to result from (weak) bidirectional Optimality Theory. But before we apply 
Blutner’s (2000) framework of bidirectional Optimality Theory to the data in the previous 
sections, we will provide some background information to the idea of optimization of 
interpretation.  
 Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky 1993; 1997) applied to the domains of 
syntax and semantics involves two closely related issues: 1. given a semantic input within a 
certain context, what is its optimal expression; and 2. given a syntactic input within a certain 
context, what is its optimal interpretation? In Optimality Theoretic syntax (henceforth, OT 
syntax), the input is usually considered to be a semantic structure (e.g., a predicate-argument 
structure) which gives rise to an, in principle infinite number of syntactic structures of which 
the most harmonic or optimal one is eventually realized as the grammatical structure that 
syntactically expresses the semantic input. Thus, OT syntax optimizes syntactic structure with 
respect to a semantic input. One might say that OT syntax takes the perspective of a speaker, 
who has a certain thought and wants to express it correctly and optimally in a syntactic 
structure. 
OT semantics, on the other hand, takes the point of view of a hearer, who hears (or 
reads) an utterance with a certain syntactic structure and wants to interpret this structure 
correctly and optimally. In OT semantics, the input is associated with an, in principle infinite 
number of possible interpretations of which the most harmonic or optimal one is eventually 
arrived at as the correct interpretation of the input utterance (Hendriks and de Hoop 2001).  
 The constraints that play a role in the optimization process can be syntactic, 
phonological, pragmatic or semantic in nature. Part of the set of constraints is assumed to be 
universal and some constraints may play a role in both semantics and syntax. Obviously, then, 
the crucial difference between OT syntax and OT semantics does not lie in the (type of) 
constraints under consideration, but in the direction of optimization. In OT syntax, the 
direction of optimization is from meaning to form, whereas in OT semantics, it is from form 
to meaning. 
Since Optimality Theory does not support a modular view on grammar, linguistic 
phenomena and linguistic processes can be the result of the interaction among different 
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linguistic components. Because Optimality Theory allows for a formalization of 
multidimensional constraint interaction, it seems particularly suited to deal with the complex 
interaction among constraints on form, intonation, context and interpretation. 
 Let us now turn to the analysis of the possible forms and interpretations of indefinite 
subjects and objects. The constraints we use are not new; they have been linguistically 
motivated in the literature, although we may formulate them slighthly differently. What is 
new is our conception of these constraints as soft, i.e., violable. In order to determine the 
optimal output for a certain input, one must try to satisfy as many constraints as possible, and 
only violate constraints when this allows one to satisfy the stronger ones. 
 We will use the following constraints on meaning and form in our analysis: 
 
(17) M1: Subjects outrank objects in referentiality, i.e., subjects get a referential 
interpretation, while objects get a non-referential interpretation. 
(18) M2: Indefinite noun phrases get a non-referential interpretation. 
(19) F1: Indefinite objects do not scramble. 
(20) F2: Subjects are in standard subject position, referred to as [Spec,IP]. 
 
These four constraints will give us the unmarked meanings of indefinite subjects and objects 
as the optimal candidates from an OT-semantic point of view, and the unmarked forms from 
an OT-syntactic point of view. These constraints, however, cannot account for the marked 
meanings (and neither for the marked forms).  
However, marked meanings of indefinite subjects and objects do occur. Adult 
speakers of English can easily interpret an indefinite object such as the one in (1) above, both 
non-referentially (the unmarked reading) and referentially (the marked reading). Similarly, 
indefinite subjects such as the one in (7) above, receive either an unmarked, referential, or a 
marked, non-referential, reading in English. Both with respect to indefinite objects as with 
respect to indefinite subjects, the marked reading can be the optimal reading of the unmarked 
form (sometimes, the unmarked form is the only available form) within a certain context. For 
example, if sentence (1) above is embedded in a story in which the two guys that Donald 
didn’t find have already been brought into the attention of the hearer, then the referential 
reading will come out as optimal. Likewise, if the sentence in (7) is uttered out of the blue and 
some is unstressed (written as sm by Milsark 1977), then the optimal reading for the indefinite 
subject is the non-referential reading. So, without additional information from the (linguistic 
or extra-linguistic) context or from the intonational pattern, the unmarked reading is the 
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optimal one, but a marked reading can be the optimal one within a certain context. In 
Optimality Theory this can be explained if we allow pragmatic and prosodic constraints to 
interfere with the meaning constraints formulated above. For example, different factors may 
favour a referential reading: anaphoric noun phrases are interpreted referentially, animate 
noun phrases are easier to interpret referentially than inanimate ones, agentivity favours a 
referential reading as well as topic-hood and (high-) prominency in the discourse.  
In general, we assume that contextual and/or prosodic information can trigger marked 
meanings of unmarked forms. In some cases, the unmarked form is the only form available. 
This holds for instance for the indefinite direct objects in English. But as for the indefinite 
subjects in English and Dutch and the indefinite objects in Dutch, there is an alternative, 
‘marked’ form available. Yet, even in those cases, the unmarked form can still receive a 
marked interpretation within a certain context. That is, the indefinite subject in standard 
subject position can get a non-referential reading in a presentational context (Milsark 1977). 
Similarly, an unsrambled indefinite object can receive a referential reading within a certain 
context, as already pointed out by De Hoop (1996). 
Crucially, however, when a marked form is used, the marked reading emerges 
irrespective of the context. That is, adult hearers of Dutch interpret a scrambled indefinite 
object referentially, even in the absence of any further contextual or prosodic information. 
Similarly, an indefinite subject is interpreted non-referentially when it is in the embedded 
position of an existential construction. In conclusion, in the absence of further context, 
marked forms give rise to marked meanings, just like unmarked forms give rise to unmarked 
meanings. Bidirectional OT (Blutner 2001) provides us with a straightforward explanation of 
how these unmarked and marked form-meaning pairs arise. 
 The basic idea of bidirectional OT is to simultaneously optimize in both directions, 
from form to meaning and from meaning to form. That is, bidirectional OT adds to the 
general procedure of optimization that the hearer takes into account the speaker’s perspective 
(and, the other way around, the speaker takes into account the hearer’s perspective). That is, if 
a form is associated with a certain interpretation within a certain context by a hearer, then 
within that same context, the same meaning would have been expressed by the same form if 
the hearer would have been the speaker. To put it differently, the composition of a form-
meaning pair within a context goes hand in hand with the decomposition of that form-
meaning pair within that same context. Crucially, bidirectional optimization involves the 
evaluation of form-meaning pairs against a set of  ranked (cross-modular) constraints.   
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Instead of giving the relevant definitions of how to determine which pairs of forms 
and meanings are optimal, we will just provide a schematic example in order to illustrate the 
basic characteristics of bidirectional OT. Assume that we have two forms f1 and f2 and two 
meanings m1 and m2. We stipulate that the form f1 is less marked (more harmonic) than the 
form f2 which means that for a given meaning, form f1 will be the optimal form. Furthermore, 
interpretation m1 is less marked (more harmonic) than the interpretation m2, which means that 
for a given form, meaning m1 will be the optimal meaning. Thus, the following ordering 
relation between form-meaning pairs can be derived, represented in an arrow diagram, where 
the arrows point to the preferred pair.  
 
(21)  
 <f1, m1> ← <f2, m1> 
 
↑ ↑ 
 
<f1, m2> ← <f2, m2> 
 
In Blutner’s (2000) framework a form-meaning pair <f, m> is called super-optimal if and 
only if there is no other super-optimal pair <f’, m> such that <f’, m> is more harmonic than 
<f, m> and there is no other super-optimal pair <f, m’> such that <f, m’> is more harmonic 
than <f, m>. The reader may verify that according to this definition, there are two super-
optimal pairs in the diagram in (21), namely <f1, m1> and <f2, m2>. Indeed, although f2 is not 
an optimal form itself and m2 is not an optimal meaning, the pair  <f2, m2> is super-optimal, 
because there is no super-optimal pair that blocks it (that is, the two candidates <f1, m2> and  
<f2, m1> are not super-optimal, because they are both blocked by the other super-optimal pair 
<f1, m1>). 
 Thus, bidirectional OT provides us with two super-optimal form-meaning pairs, in 
accordance with the markedness principle: the unmarked form with the unmarked meaning, 
and the marked form with the marked meaning.  
 Let us now give a bidirectional OT analysis of the data under discussion in this paper. 
We evaluate form-meaning pairs against the constraints M1, M2, F1, and F2 given above (see 
(17)-(20)). The super-optimal pairs are indicated with the symbol $in the tableaux. 
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(22) Bidirectional OT tableau: indefinite objects 
 
Input: [f, m]  indefinite object 
f:  1. unscrambled; 2. scrambled 
m: 1. non-referential (type <e,t>); 2. referential (type e) 
M1  
 
M2 
 
F1 
 
[- scrambling, <e,t>]                                                    $ 9 9 9 
[- scrambling, e] * * 9 
[+ scrambling, <e,t>] 9 9 * 
[+ scrambling, e]                                                          $ * * * 
 
In the above tableau we see that although the indefinite object that combines a referential 
meaning with a scrambled word order, violates all three constraints that seem to be relevant, it 
does represent a super-optimal pair, simply because there is no super-optimal pair available 
that has either a more harmonic form or a more harmonic meaning. The only other super-
optimal pair has both a more harmonic form and a more harmonic meaning and therefore it 
cannot block the ‘marked’ super-optimal pair. Thus, the bidirectional OT approach 
straightforwardly accounts for the scrambling phenomenon of indefinite objects in Dutch.  
 A similar analysis can be provided for the possible forms and meanings of indefinite 
subjects, as illustrated below. 
 
(23) Bidirectional OT tableau: indefinite subjects 
 
Input: [f, m]  indefinite subject 
f:  1.[Spec,IP] (standard); 2. [Spec,VP] (embedded) 
m: 1. referential (type e); 2. non-referential (type <e,t>) 
M1  
 
M2 
 
F2 
 
[[Spec, IP], e]                                                                  $ 9 * 9 
[[Spec, IP], <e,t>] * 9 9 
[[Spec, VP], e] 9 * * 
[[Spec, VP], <e,t>]                                                          $ * 9 * 
 
Because the constraint M1 (subjects get a referential reading) outranks M2 (indefinites get a 
non-referential reading), the meaning that satisfies M1 and violates M2 is the optimal 
(unmarked) meaning, while the meaning that violates M1 but satisfies M2 is less harmonic 
 14 
(marked). One super-optimal pair links the unmarked meaning to the unmarked position (the 
standard subject position) while the other super-optimal pair links the marked meaning to the 
marked position (the embedded subject position). 
 In conclusion, we find that a bidirectional OT analysis straightforwardly explains the adult 
pattern of the interpretation of both indefinite objects and indefinite subjects. Adults are able 
to evaluate form-meaning pairs. That means that they cannot only find the optimal form for a 
certain meaning or the optimal meaning of a certain form, they are also capable of 
determining as a super-optimal pair the combination of a form that is sub-optimal from a 
unidirectional syntactic perspective and a meaning that is sub-optimal from a unidirectional 
semantic perspective.  
 We would now like to use the bidirectional OT framework for our explanation of the 
children’s pattern of interpreting indefinite subjects and objects. Clearly, as soon as children 
have acquired the constraints M1 and M2 and their ranking, they will assign a non-referential 
reading to indefinite objects, and a referential reading to indefinite subjects, independent of 
the position these noun phrases occupy. This is exactly in accordance with what has been 
attested in the experiments, as discussed in section 1 above. In other words, these results 
indicate that children have acquired the relevant interpretive constraints and their ranking, and 
therefore they can determine the optimal meaning of the optimal form (that is, the ‘unmarked’ 
super-optimal pair). 
 But children deviate from adult’s interpretations, when they are required to arrive at a 
‘marked’ meaning. Sometimes this is due to the fact that the children do not have acquired all 
the relevant cross-modular constraints yet or that they have not yet captured the right 
weighting or ranking of these constraints. They have difficulties in integrating the information 
from the context and the intonational pattern into their interpretation of the form. A different 
explanation is available when children do not obtain a marked meaning of a marked form. In 
that particular case, it seems that they optimize the interpretation of the marked (e.g., 
scrambled) form uni-directionally instead of bidirectionally. Thus, children’s optimal 
interpretation of a marked form will be the same as their optimal interpretation of an 
unmarked form in that same context. In that case, we predict a non-referential reading of the 
indefinite object in scrambled position and a referential reading of the indefinite subject in 
embedded subject position. In order to get the right interpretation for the indefinite subject or 
object in a marked position, however, the child must learn to apply the process of 
optimization bidirectionally. What is needed therefore is the following ‘reasoning’ by the 
child: I can find the optimal interpretation for this form, but I notice that the form is sub-
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optimal; the speaker would have used the optimal form for the optimal meaning (the 
‘unmarked’ super-optimal form-meaning pair), therefore I must choose the sub-optimal 
meaning for this sub-optimal form, which will give me another (‘marked’) super-optimal 
form-meaning pair. We think that this bidirectional OT analysis of indefinite subject and 
object interpretation clarifies in what sense children's interpretations deviate from the adult 
interpretations. Obviously, they might also have problems in determining the optimal 
interpretation in a certain context independently of the markedness of the form. But they 
definitely fail when they have to assign a sub-optimal (marked) reading to a sub-optimal 
(marked) form. Before the 4-year old child will be a competent, adultlike hearer of her 
language, she must acquire the full process of optimization of interpretation, which not only 
involves taking into account cross-modular constraint interaction but also the speaker’s 
perspective of optimization in a bidirectional appraoch. 
  
 
4. Some exceptional interpretations 
 
The analysis presented in the previous section straightforwardly derives the data concerning 
children’s unmarked interpretations of indefinite subjects and objects described in section 1. 
The OT account explains the similarity to the cross-linguistic adult interpretations with 
respect to the referential reading of indefinite subjects and the non-referential reading of 
indefinite objects. Furthermore, our approach accounts for the fact that children deviate 
exactly in those contexts when adults assign a marked meaning to a marked form, i.e., when 
an indefinite subject must be interpreted non-referentially because it is in an embedded 
position, and when an indefinite object must be interpreted referentially because it is in a 
scrambled position. 
However, it would not be true to say that children never arrive at a marked meaning at 
all. In this section we will discuss two cases where children seem to get a marked meaning. In 
the first case they incorrectly assign a marked (non-referential) interpretation to an indefinite 
subject. In the second case they correctly assign a marked (referential) interpretation to an 
indefinite object. We claim that these cases do not provide counter-examples to our 
optimization approach. In fact, both cases can be explained within the uni-directional 
perspective of optimization of interpretation. 
One case was described by Krämer (2000). She found that for sentence (24), 
approximately half the children had a non-referential interpretation of the indefinite subject, 
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i.e. the children manipulated two different marbles, once each. Adults, however, would favour 
a referential reading of the indefinite subject in (24). 
 
(24) Een knikker mag  twee  keer  rollen. 
a  marble   may  two time roll 
“A marble may roll twice.”   
 
We have argued above that indefinite subjects show a conflict in interpretation. One 
constraint states that subjects favour a referential reading and the other constraint states that 
indefinites favour a non-referential reading. Therefore, unlike indefinite objects, indefinite 
subjects are subject to two violating constraints. This makes the interpretation of an indefinite 
subject dependent on the ranking of the two constraints. If the subject constraint outranks the 
indefiniteness constraint, we predict a referential reading, whereas if the ranking is the other 
way around, we predict a non-referential reading. Since in Dutch the indefinite subject in (24) 
must get a referential reading (hence, it takes scope over twee keer ‘twice’), we conclude that 
the subject condition must outrank the indefiniteness condition, and therefore the referential 
reading is the winner. However, as we already pointed out above, there are more factors than 
just the form (indefinite) and the grammatical function (subject or object) that contribute to a 
referential or non-referential interpretation of a noun phrase. Animacy, agentivity, topicality, 
and/or discourse-prominence contribute to referentiality, too. Children who get a non-
referential reading for the subject in (24) do not have captured yet the relative dominance of 
the subject condition. The problem is that in this case the other factors together strongly 
suggest a non-referential reading, that is, the fact that ‘a marble’ is inanimate, that it cannot be 
an agent, that it is not very likely to play a prominent role in the discourse, and that it is lowly 
individualized in the sense that is almost impossible to distinguish one marble from the other. 
We think that this ‘conspiracy’ of factors pointing into the direction of a non-referential 
reading indeed explains why half of the children arrive at the non-referential reading as the 
optimal interpetation in this context. By contrast, children do correctly assign a referential 
reading to the indefinite subject in the intransitive sentence in (8) above (Bergsma-Klein 
1996). But in that sentence, although the subject is indefinite, it refers to an individual that is 
clearly animate and moreover, which was already introduced in the context of a story, unlike 
the marble of (24). 
The second case we would like to discuss is one where children are adult-like in that they 
obtain a marked reading of an unmarked form within a certain context. Indeed, such 
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interpretations are found by Miller and Schmitt (2003). In a context in which the indefinite 
object is made high-prominent in the discourse, 92% of the children between age 3;10 and 5;8 
indeed assign a referential reading to the indefinite object. A relevant example is given in (26) 
with the preceding context in (25): 
 
(25) [Picture 1] This is Kelly and these are eggs that are all in a basket. Look, Kelly is 
painting them. Her mom told her to paint all of the eggs before going outside to 
play. Let’s see what happened. 
[Picture 2] Look, now Kelly is going outside to play. But what about this one? 
(point to leftover egg and pause) Let’s see if the monster knows what happened: 
(26) Kelly didn’t paint an egg. 
 
As pointed out by Miller and Schmitt (2003), children are able to interpret an egg in (26) 
referentially, just like adults. As in the case of subjects, we assume that apart from the 
indefinite form and the grammatical function, other factors may trigger either a referential or a 
non-referential reading. Clearly, although an egg is both indefinite and inanimate, it does 
seem to play an important role in the discourse, and the hearer’s attention has certainly been 
drawn to this individual. This makes the referential reading the winning interpretation after all, 
not only for adults, but for most of the children as well (cf. also Gualmini 2002).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have presented a optimization approach of the interpretation of indefinite subjects and 
objects that accounts for the subject-object asymmetry as well as the markedness principle. 
For children, the acquisition of unmarked meanings for unmarked forms seems relatively easy 
to acquire, while most deviations from the adult patterns are found when children have to 
assign marked meanings to unmarked or marked forms. The last pattern is presumably the 
most difficult to acquire since it involves the evaluation of form-meaning pairs.  
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